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Since 1984, Texaco and Pennzoil have been engaged in a legal battle over
Texaco's usurpation of Pennzoil in the takeover of the Cetty Oil Company. The
stakes are huge: the jury award that has been upheld through several appeals
calls for Texaco to pay Pennzoil more than $10 billion. The Texaco-Pennzoil
case presents a unique natural experiment for studying debt burdens and
bargaining costs. Essentially continuous market assessments of the prospects of
both parties in a high stakes bargaining game are rarely as observable as they
are in the case of publicly traded companies like Texaco and Pennzoil. Further,
unlike in the Texaco case, financial distress is usually brought on by events
impinging directly on a firm's operations, thus making the costs of distress
difficult to measure.
This paper uses data on the abnormal returns earned by the shareholders of
Texaco and Penrtzoil to examine whether resources were "lost" in the course of
the litigation.We find that the leakage involved in the forced transfer is
enormous: each dollar of value lost by Texaco's shareholders has been matched by
only about 30 cents gain to the owners of Pennzoil. Our estimates suggest that
the Texaco-Fennzoil conflict has reduced the combined equity value of the two
companies by about $2 billion. Further losses have been suffered by Texaco's
bondholders, though these may be offset by the tax collections that would result
if Texaco made a large payment to Pennzoil.
After documenting the large joint losses that Texaco and Pennzoil have
suffered, we seek to identify their causes. Clearly one explanition is the fees
that both companies will pay to the many lawyers, investment hnnkers, and
advisors that have been retained. Even making generous allowance for these
costs, however, we are unable to account for a large fract1nri nf the loss in2
combined value. It appears that there have been additional costs to Texaco's
shareholders from disruptions in Texaco's operations, difficulties in obtaining
credit, incentive problems created by fears that Texaco would cease operations,
and distraction of top management.
We conclude the paper by discussing a number of implications of the results
for economic analysis. First, the huge joint losses suffered by the continued
disagreement illustrate that efficient bargains will not always be struck even
in situations where neither side possesses much relevant private information.
Second, the losses evidence the adverse effects that financial distress can have
on productivity. This may have implications for bankruptcy cost explanations of
firms' debt-equity choices, macroeconomic theories that stress credit
disruptions as an important element in busines cycle fluctuations, and arguments
that debt relief for major debtor nations would make all parties to the LDC debt
crisis better off.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly recounts the history
of the Texaco-Pennzoil dispute and describes the event study methodology
employed in our analysis. Section II demonstrates the large losses in combined
value during the litigation. Section III considers the effects of the dispute
on Texaco's bondholders and the government's tax claim. Section IV examines
potential causes of the loss in joint value.Section V concludes by discussing
some implications of our findings.
The Texaco-Pennzoil dispute arose from the bids both companies made to
I. The Texaco-Pennzoil Conflict3
acquire Getty On January 2, 1984, Pennzoil reached what it felt was a
binding agreement with the directors of Getty Oil to acquire 3/7 of Getty.
Within a week of the Pennzoil-Getty proposed sale, however, Texaco purchased all
of the Getty stock at a higher price per share. As a condition of the sale,
Texaco indemnified Getty Oil and its largest shareholders against any possible
lawsuit from Pennzoil. Thus, when Pennzoil sued for breach of contract and
inducement to breach of contract, Texaco became liable for any damages caused by
Cetty.
The case was ultimately brought before Texas State Court and was tried in
mid-1985. A decision was reached on November 19, 1985 [event 1] in favor of
Pennzoil, with the judgment for $7.53 billion in actual damages, $3.0 billion in
punitive damages, and $1.5 billion in accrued interest. The jury's decision was
widely decried in the press. Commentators uniformly attacked the size of the
judgment, noting that it was based on the replacement cost of the oil that
Pennzoil would have obtained by purchasing Getty, not on the damages that
Pennzoil suffered by failing to acquire Cetty at the price that had been agreed
on. There was a widespread expectation that the judge would either overturn the
judgment or reduce the damages substantially. Notwithstanding these
predictions, on December 10, 1985 [event 2], the Texas judge denied Texaco's
request to overrule the jury, and affirmed the jury's award.
Under Texas law, Texaco had to post a bond in the full amount of the
judgment to appeal the case. Texaco objected to the requirement and appealed
the issue to a Federal Court in New York. On December 18, 1985 [event 3],
1
The description of the dispute here is necessarily brief. Entertaining
narrative histories of the Getty case may be found in Petzinger (1987) and Coll
(1987). We have also drawn heavily on the ongoing reporting of the Wall Street
Journal and New York Times.4
Texaco received a Temporary Restraining Order prohibiting Pennzoil from
attaching liens to Texaco's assets until the bond matter could be decided. A
hearing on the requirement was held in early January 1986, and on January 10,
1986 [event 4], the Federal judge ruled that Texaco only had to post a $1
billion bond to appeal the case. A Federal Court of Appeals upheld this ruling
on February 20, 1986 [event 5].
After the Appeals Court ruling, both sides appealed the decisions favorable
to the other side. Texaco obtained a hearing on the original case in the Texas
Court of Appeals, and on February 12, 1987 [event 6], that court upheld all but
$2 billion of the judgment for Pennzoil. Pennzoil, meanwhile, appealed the bond
reduction to the United States Supreme Court. On April 6, 1987 [event 7], the
Supreme Court vacated the Federal court ruling. Faced with liens being placed
on its assets, on April 12, 1987 [event 8], Texaco filed for bankruptcy.
Though Texaco was in bankruptcy, periodic rumors about a settlement did
surface. On May 10, 1987 [event 9], when Texaco announced new loans of $2
billion, it was widely speculated that the two companies had reached a
settlement. Texaco, however, insisted that the loans were solely to finance
ongoing negotiations. Ultimately, nothing came of the rumors.
II. The Effects of the Conflict on Shareholder Wealth
Methodology
In order to measure the impact of the conflict on the two companies, we
examine the abnormal changes in equity values induced by news bearing on the
outcome of the litigation. We use the market model to measure abnormal5
returns :2
R. =a.+ fi.*R+ c. (1) it 1 1 mt it
where R. and P.are the return on stock i and the market at time t. The it mt
abnormal return on stock i at time t is measured as the residual, c. .The
it
abnormal return is multiplied by the value of the outstanding equity of each
company to estimate the changes in wealth caused by news about the litigation.3
Market Response
As a first check on whether the dispute had substantial effects on the
valuation of the two stocks, we examined the correlations between the stocks'
abnormal returns. If litigation news was frequent and had large effects, the
two returns should show a lower correlation than would otherwise be expected.
This appears to be the case. For 8 oil companies not involved in the litiga-
tion,4 the average pairwise correlation of abnormal returns sinceJanuary 1985
is 0.384, with a standard deviation of 0.092. None of these 28 correlations is
less than 0.245. For Texaco and Pennzoil, the correlation is -O.Ol9. Thus,
2
For a more complete discussion of the event study methodology employed
here, see Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) and Schwert (1981).
We use return data from January 1985 to May 1987. The data were
adjusted for dividend payments and stock splits. The market return was proxied
as the return on the Standard and Poors Composite Stock Index.
These companies were Ashland Oil, Arco, Chevron, Exxon, Mobil,
Occidental, Shell, and Unocal.
One possible explanation for the negative correlation is that periods of
non-trading result in non-contemporaneous reactions to the same news. If this
were true, the one period lead or lag returns should be positively correlated.
Leading and lagging Texaco's return by one period, however, yields correlations6
the litigation news appears to account for a substantial fraction of the return
variance of both companies.6
The most natural measure of the total costs involved in the dispute is the
change in value of the two companies induced by important events. Table 1 shows
the effects of each of the events descibed in Section I on the market value of
both companies. We calculate the changes for both a single and multi-dayperiod
immediately after the litigation announcement.7
Table 1 provides strong evidence that the market associated large costs
with forced transfers from Texaco to Pennzoil. While Texaco's and Pennzoil's
share prices almost always moved in opposite directions, Texaco'schange in
value usually dwarfed that of Pennzoil. In the four court decisionsagainst
Texaco [events 1, 2, 6 and 7],Texaco'sone day loss was on average 68 percent
greater than Pennzoil's gain. In no case did Pennzoil gain even half as much
as Texaco lost.
While the results are less significant for the decisionsfavoring Texaco
[events 3, 4 and 5], they nonetheless support the view that the debt burden is
large. Exclusive of the Federal Court bond reduction,8 Texaco seems to benefit
of -0.116 and 0.035. We thus reject this explanation of thecorrelation.
6
This test actually understates the significance of thedispute because
some events, such as the bankruptcy filing by Texaco and the settlement talks
the two companies periodically held caused the prices of thetwo stocks to move
together.
Appendix Table A-l repeats the analysis using the return on the standard
and Poors Composite Oil Index as a proxy for the marketreturn. The results are
similar to those in Table 1.
8
The New York Times commented that the returns on thisday were partly a
reaction to the court ruling and partly a reaction to a fall in oilprices. As
Table A-l shows, Texaco lost much less value in relation to the OilIndex inTable 1
Litigation Announcements and Changes in Value
Day After Announcement Five Days After Announcement
Change in Value Change in Value
($million) Loss ($million) Loss
No. Event Texaco Pennzoil Ratio TexacoPennzoil Ratio
1Nov. 19, 1985:
Texas jury rules -$646.0$300.453.5% -$1,114.9 $488.9 56.1%
for Pennzoil (154.8) (46.3) (316.6) (118.8)
2Dec. 10, 1985:
Texas state judge -$573.5 $16.597.1% -$782.4 -$148.5
affirms jury award (121.3) (62.1) (256.8) (138.2)
3Dec. 18, 1985:
Texaco obtains $443.4 -$127.471.3% $693.8 $82.8
Temporary Re- (109.0) (60.5) (259.5) (132.0)
straining Order
4Jan. 10, 1986:
Bond requirement -$122.0 -$90.8 -$396.2 -$94.3
reduced (124.2) (66.7) (268.8) (146.7)
5Feb. 20, 1986:
Federal Court up- $15.1 $21.3 $177.7 -$19.589.0%
holds bond reduction(117.5) (53.2) (263.0) (119.9)
6Feb. 12, 1987:
Court of Appeals -$802.6$379.652.7% -$1,054.0 $191.381.9%
upholds judgment (170.5) (69.1) (348.0) (168.3)
7Apr. 6, 1987:
Supreme Court va- -$994.4$269.472.9% -$1,278.8 $517.559.5%
cates bond rulings (166.7) (80.0) (338.1) (188.8)
TOTAL -$2,680.0$769.071.3% -$3,754.8 $1,018.272.9%
(369.7) (167.8) (781.3) (388.0)
8Apr. 12, 1987:
Texaco files for -$717.5 -$560.1 -$308.4-$645.9
bankruptcy (141.2) (90.5) (302.6) (175.2)
9May 10, 1987:
Settlement rumors $633.8$110.5 $335.4 -$44.5
(157.2) (82.1) (360.5) (183.5)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
**Percentageof change in Texaco's value not accounted for by change in
Pennzoil's value7
greatly; the return to Pennzoil is less clear.
The combined loss to shareholders in the two companies is stiking. Using
single day returns, Texaco's value fell a total of nearly $2.7 billion;
Pennzoil's rose only $770 million. Over all the events, Pennzoil gained only 29
percent of what Texaco lost. This loss represents over 12 percent of the
combined value of the two companies.
Table 1 also shows that the two stock prices moved together in reaction to
the bankruptcy filing of Texaco and the subsequent settlement rumors; values
fell when Texaco filed for bankruptcy and soared when the companies were thought
to be near settlement.9 Press reports and conversations with analysts suggest
that Texaco's bankruptcy filing moved share values because it affected market
perceptions of the likelihood of a settlement, not because it revealed
previously private information about Texaco's financial condition. The
implication is that dispute itself is costly, and that settlement confers a net
gain to be distributed between the companies.
In order to measure the effects on share prices of aspects of the
litigation not revealed by discrete events, Table 2 presents monthly abnormal
returns over the one-and-a-half year period since the original jury decision.1°
this week.
This reaction is also found on other days with settlement news. In a
series of negotiations in late 1985 and early 1986, news that a settlement was
more likely resulted in an average increase in total value of almost $140
million. The gains were split almost evenly between companies. News that the
dispute would be more prolonged decreased both values by similar amounts.
10
Each month's total is the sum within the month of the weekly excess
return (computed relative to the Composite Oil Index) times the company's market
value at the end of the previous week.Table 2




Month Texaco Pennzoil Ratio
November 1985 -$1,533.4 $644.1 58.0%
December 1985 -$107.8 -$14.0
-- -
January1986 $29.1 $173.4
February 1986 $317.5 -$492.9
March 1986 -$183.2 $39.8 78.3%
April 1986 $534.0 -$459.1 14.0%
May 1986 $169.9 $48.0
June 1986 -$226.7 $61.6 72.8%
July 1986 -$28.1 $12.2 56.6%
August 1986 $69.9 -$227.6
Sepember 1986 $229.7 $237.3
October 1986 $455.5 $491.9
November 1986 -$649.8 -$134.5
December 1986 $468.1 -$281.6 39.8%
January 1987 -$201.1 -$75.0
February 1987 -$618.9 $342.1 44.7%
March 1987 -$121.4 -$108.2
April 1987 -$840.6 -$208.0
TOTAL -$2,237.3 $49.5 97.8%
*Millionsof Dollars
**Percentageof change in Texacos value not accounted for by change in
Pennzoil's value8
While the total abnormal return to Pennzoil is not very large ($50 million), the
loss to Texaco is enormous ($2.2 billion). Most of the losses are in months
where important litigation events occurred: in November and December 1985 and
February and April 1987, Texaco lost over $3.0 billion, while Pennzoil gained
only $764 million. This information suggests that the market response to the
discrete events discussed in Section I provides a reasonably accurate estimate
of the total effects of the litigation on the two companies.
III. The Effects on Other Claimants
There are two principal claimants, in addition to Pennzoil, that stand to
be affected by the litigation: the holders of Texaco debt; and the Federal
government, through its tax claim on the two companies.11 We examine the
effects of the litigation on these claimants in turn.
Texaco' s Bondholders
For holders of Texaco's debt, litigation and bankruptcy pose two problems.
First, under the terms of the reorganization, their claims may be reduced or
eliminated completely. Second, in the event of liquidation, bondholders could
suffer (or gain) from redemption of the outstanding debt at par value, not
market value.
Bondholders were, throughout the litigation period, by far the largest
11
The effect on Pennzoil's bondholders is not included in the analysis
since the value of these claims was never in doubt. In fact, the price of
Pennzoil debt moved very little over the period and showed no exceptional
movements in response to any of the litigation announcements.9
claimants.'2 We therefore focus on the induced change in value of Texaco's
bonds. To determine these changes, we used the following procedure. For each
issue listed on the event dayj3 we computed the abnormal return relative to a
long term oil company bondJ4 Using book value weights, we then computed an
average debt return. In addition, we computed the average price-to-face value
ratio on the day before the event.We then found the change in debt value as
the book value of long term debt as of the end of the previous quarter times the
average price-to-face value ratio (to find the market value of debt) times the
average abnormal return on the debt.
Table 3 shows the changes in debt value on each of the important events.
The return to bondholders mirrored that to stockholders. Adverse announcements
in the litigation proceedings [events 1, 2, 6 and 7] reduced the value of the
debt; favorable announcements increased debt value. The aggregate effect of the
seven events is a fall of $660 million in the value of Texaco's debt. This
figure obtains despite the fact that debt selling below face value fell by much
less than higher yield debt. When Texaco filed for bankruptcy, for example, its
average debt value fell by almost 12 percent, while some of its low yield debt
fell by only 2 percent.
12At the time of bankruptcy, Texaco had $8.4 billion in bonds outstanding,
of which $6.8 billion was long term.
13The specific issues we used, by maturity date and coupon rate, were:
1997 at 5 3/4%; 2001 at 7 3/4%; 2005 at 8 7/8%; 2006 at 8 1/2%; 1994 at 13 5/8%;
2000 at 11 1/4%; 1991 at l3s%; 1999 at 13 1/4%; 2000 at 10 3/4%; 1989 at lls%;
and 1988 at 9s%. The first four issues were by Texaco Inc. The remaining bonds
were offered through subsidiaries but were guaranteed by the parent company.
14We used a 6 percent coupon rate, 1997 expiration Exxon bond.Table 3
Change in Value of Texaco Debt
Average Total Change
NumberDate Excess Return in Market Value
1 November 19, 1985 -0.7% -$65.2
2 December 10, 1986 -4.6% -$428.7
3 December 18, 1985 1.0% $89.7
4 January 10, 1986 1.8% $115.8
5 February 20, 1986 -0.1% -$6.4
6 February 12, 1987 -2.4% -$164.9
7 April 6, 1987 -3.0% -$200.2
-12.2% -$659.9 TOTAL
*Millionsof Dollars10
The Government's Tax Claim
Under Federal law, damage payments are both taxable on receipt and
deductible on payment. Thus, one might expect that the resolution of the case
would not affect government revenue collections. Three considerations suggest
that a settlement between Texaco and Pennzoil could affect the government's tax
collections, however.
First, it seems unlikely that Texaco could utilize all of the tax losses
generated by a payment to Pennzoil. In the past 5 years, Texaco has received
tax refunds 4 times; earnings and previous taxes are thus clearly inadequate to
immediately offset the losses. Further, as of the end of 1986, Texaco already
had $663 million in foreign tax credit carryforwards and an unspecified amount
in domestic loss carryforwards.
Second, the distinction in the tax law between ordinary income and capital
gains could have lowered the tax liability of Pennzoil for any receipt in 1986
or 1987. By purchasing assets from Texaco at a below-market price, Pennzoil
could have avoided all but capital gains taxes on the step-up in basis of the
assets. Since a settlement of this type was considered the most likely source
of payment, the implied tax liability may have been the capital gains rate.15
Third, Federal law stipulates that in cases of "involuntary conversion" of
property into similar property or cash used to purchase similar property within
15There was also some discussion about ways of structuring transfers to
make them entirely tax free. Generally, these involved taking assets from both
companies and putting them in a third company, which was jointly owned by the
two groups of shareholders. Under certain circumstances, this company might not
pay any taxes. Such transfers, however, were noted to be difficult to
structure, and there was no guarantee that they would, in fact, be tax free.
Indeed, much more journalistic attention was paid to schemes to "transform"
receipts from ordinary income to capital gains. We thus focus on this more
narrow tax consequence of any payment.11
two years, the recipient of the resulting capital gain is not liable for tax on
the gainJ6 It is possible that Texaco's payments to Pennzoil would qualify as
an involuntary conversion of Getty assets that Texaco had stolen from Pennzoil,
and so would be tax free. Pennzoil has stated that it intends to file such a
claim. There is, however, substantial skepticism among knowledgable observers
about whether an involuntary conversion claim would be accepted by the IRS.
The ultimate tax consequences of any payment are thus highly uncertain,
both for the liability upon receipt and for the deduction upon payment. A
consideration of debt and taxes together, however, makes it clear that the
claims of these creditors cannot explain the large loss in value. Even if the
market anticipated that Texaco could not use any of the deductions resulting
from a payment to Pennzoil, that Pennzoil would have to pay a 28 percent capital
gains tax on receipt, and that the payment from Texaco to Pennzoil will equal
Texaco's loss in value, not Pennzoil's gain in value, the taxes paid to the
government on account of the litigation would come to only $760 million. This
is about equal to the loss to Texaco's bondholders. We thus conclude that the
combined loss of $1.9 billion in the equity value of the two companies may even
be an underestimate of the dissipation in value caused by the Texaco-Pennzoil
conflict.
IV.WhereDid the Value Go?
One possible explanation for the large losses is the direct expenses that
16
An involuntary conversion is defined as: "(1) destruction of property in
whole or in part; or (2) theft; or (3) actual seizure; or (4) requisition or
condemnation or threat or imminence of requisition or condemnation."12
both companies will pay to bankruptcy lawyers, trustees, and other litigation
participants. Given the importance of the judgment, lawyers on both sides are
plentiful, and legal fees are bound to be rather large.
It is difficult to believe that total fees for the case will be as large as
$1.9 billion, however. On August 27, 1987, Texaco announced that its legal fees
since the original jury decision had been $55 million. Texaco must also pay an
estimated $3.5 million each month for the bankruptcy expenses of the company and
of the creditor committees. The present value of total payments over a five
year period is thus about $250 million.
It is unclear how much Pennzoil will pay in total legal fees for the case.
Pennzoil's lead attorney, Joe Jamail, handled most cases on a contingency fee
basis. When asked about his usual fees, he was known to joke that the only math
he knew was how to "divide by thirds" (Petzinger, p. 20). Jamail, however,
insisted he had no set fee for the case, and claimed that he took the case to
help his friends at Pennzoilj7 Assuming, though, that both Texaco and Pennzoil
have the same costs, these costs can still only explain 30 percent of the loss
in value.
A second explanation for the reduction in combined value is the secondary
costs of the debt burden imposed on Texaco. By creating uncertainty about
Texaco's long term viability, making it difficult for Texaco to obtain credit,
17
Hugh Liedtke, chairman of Pennzoil, was quoted as remarking "[Jamail]
will be paid. We just don't know how much yet." [Los Angeles Times, December
13, 1985, IV, 2:2] The Wall Street Journal seemed more definite about the
payment. "Some well-placed Wall Street sources say they understood Mr. Jamail
stands to collect 20% of the jury's award, which, if upheld, would result in a
mind-boggling $2.4 billion for him," it reported. [November 21, 1985, I, 2:3]
The New York Times was less convinced about Jamail's fees. Jamail would not
receive "anything like that magnitude [1/3 of any payment] in this case," it
reported. [November 21, 1985, IV, 4:2]13
and distracting Texaco's management, the litigation may have reduced Texaco's
value by more than the expected value of the transfers it would have to make to
Pennzoil. Effects of this kind have been stressed in discussions of credit
constraints (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1987) and of the secondary burdens
associated with LDC debt obligations (Sachs and Huizinga, 1987).
The most important evidence for the adverse effects of financial crisis is
an affidavit Texaco submitted with its bankruptcy filing describing the effect
of the week-old Supreme Court decision on its operations. The affidavit
asserted that some suppliers had demanded cash payments prior to performance or
insisted on secured forms of repayment. Others halted crude shipments
temporarily or cancelled them entirely. A number of banks had also refused to
enter into, or placed restrictions on Texaco's use of exchange rate futures
contracts. The affidavit concluded that "The increasing deterioration of
Texaco's credit and financial condition have made it more and more difficult,
with each passing day, for Texaco to continue to finance and operate its
business... As normal supply sources become inaccessible and other financing is
unavailable, Texaco's operations will begin to grind to a halt. In fact, Texaco
is already having to consider the prospect of shutting down one of its largest
domestic refineries because of its growing inability to acquire crude and
feedstock."
This sentiment has been echoed by journalistic accounts of Texaco's
actions. The New York Times, for example, noted that: "Texaco has been under
extreme financial pressure to resolve the case because of nervousness among its
lenders, suppliers and business partners about its future." [December 21, 1985,
I, 37:5] Some analysts even attributed the stock market reaction to these
costs. "One analyst says he believes the market is assuming that Texaco will14
have to pay roughly $5 billion in cash to Pennzoil. But the market has
discounted Texaco's stock even further because, he says, the company already has
been damaged by the litigation. 'They've been unable to refinance debt, they've
missed opportunities in the oil patch, and the diversion of management has to
cost something.'" [Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1987, I, 3:5]
Unfortunately, no direct evidence exists on whether these operational
problems were really of major importance. Indeed, the day after the affidavit
was filed, some of the suppliers mentioned specifically disputed Texaco's
assertions. The principle evidence of their importance is the observation that
any reasonable measure of conventional litigation costs is far below the loss in
combined value of the two companies.
A third explanation for the large loss is that Pennzoil would misuse any
payment it received from Texaco. Such explanations are consistent with the
findings of Jensen (1986) that free cash flow may be invested at below the
market return, thus lowering the value of the company. Such a theory has been
suggested by some observers. Shortly after the bankruptcy filing, the Wall
Street Journal, for example, reported that Texaco's stock price was capitalizing
a $5 billion loss, while Pennzoil's was only capitalizing a $4.5 billiongain.18
Part of this difference, it suggested, might be because of misuse of a cash
settlement.
We find it difficult to believe that this explanation can account for much
of the loss, however. Throughout the litigation, the most commonly discussed
settlement was a transfer of oil and gas properties. There would thus be no
cash for Pennzoil to misuse. Further, folk wisdom in the oil industry held that
18These were computed by determining the fundamental value of the equity
and comparing that with the current market value.15
Texaco was much more likely to dissipate free cash flowon wasteful projects
than was Pennzoil.
A final explanation for the loss in combined value is that the market
inefficiently valued the claims of the two companies. Consistent with this
view, there is evidence that news provided by the companies resulted in
asymmetric returns to the two companies. On October 8, 1987, for example,
Pennzoil rose by $170.2 million (standard error of $63.2million) and Texaco
fell by $42.0 million (standard error of $140.5 million) because "thecompany
impressed industry analysts in New York with a presentationexplaining its
position in its protracted legal dispute with Texaco" [New YorkTimes, October
9, 1987, IV, 3:1].
V. Conclusions and Implications
Our results suggest that the Texaco-Pennzoil conflict hasbeen enormously
costly. The bulk of what is at stake appears to have beendissipated by the
costs of carrying on the dispute. Texaco and Pennzoil could eliminatethe costs
associated with the continuation of their disputeby merging or negotiating a
settlement. Indeed, the evidence shows that almostany resolution of the
dispute would raise the combined value of the two companies. It isnatural to
wonder why a bargain is not struck. Economic theories ofbargaining under
complete information such as Rubenstein's (1982) celebrated workusually imply
that if both parties are fully informed,bargains should be struck immediately
and bargaining costs should not be incurred. Suchan outcome did not take place
in the Texaco-Pennzoil conflict.
The most commonly advanced explanation for failureto come to immediate16
agreement is that asymmetric information will cause the parties will hold out as
a way of signalling their private information. This argument seems like a weak
reed in the Texaco-Pennzoil case. The principle uncertainties revolved around
likely legal judgments that both parties had equivalent capacities to predict.
We have seen no indication that the parties had important but private
information about their ovm financial condition. Journalistic accounts
typically explain why no bargain has been struck by pointing to the mutual
antipathy between the executives of the two companies. Two billion dollars,
however, seems like a lot to pay to engage in pique. In the end, one senses
that something other than asymmetric information lies behind the inability of
Texaco and Pennzoil to settle the case, or alternatively that if the amount of
asymmetric information in this case is enough to explain why almost $2 billion
is sacrificed in bargaining costs, that asymmetric information must be present
in almost every bargaining situation)9
The Texaco-Pennzoil experience casts severe doubt on the proposition that
even in quite favorable circumstances two parties will work out mutually
efficient bargains. Certainly, our estimates suggest that litigation can often
be an extraordinarily inefficient process eating up much of what is fought over.
We suspect that if market valuations of the participants in other large
disputes, such as the asbestos claimants and companies could be found, they
19One possible resolution of the failure of bargaining is the agency
problem associated with shareholder lawsuits. Since Texaco's managers are
potentially personally liable for breach of fiduciary duty, they may not have an
interest in agreeing to a damage assessment. If this were the case, however, it
would seem possible for Texaco to obtain lawyers' attestations that the proposed
settlement was in the best interests of the shareholders. Further, there would
be an additional incentive to reach a settlement while in bankruptcy, since any
bankruptcy agreement would have to be approved by a bankruptcy judge as well as
by creditor and debtor committees. Bankruptcy was widely regarded as at least a
temporary end to serious negotiations, however.17
would show similar losses in joint value.20
The costs of Texaco's financial distress also shed light on severalaspects
of corporate financing and macroeconomic policy. American firmsrely heavily on
equity despite the substantial incentive to debt finance provided by the
deductability of interest but not dividends. This is often attributed to
bankruptcy costs, or more generally to the costs of financial distress (Gordon
and Malkiel, 1981). Yet empirical evidence demonstrating that these costsare
substantial has been lacking (Warner, 1977). The Texaco-Pennzoil caseprovides
at least some evidence that being saddled with excessive debt burdenscan impose
large costs on a firm. Texaco's evident difficulty in undertaking new ventures
also confirms theories emphasizing the importance of keeping debt lowto
maintain flexibility.
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987) have argued thatmonetary contractions have
substantial supply-side effects. By raising the debt burdens offirms, they
interfere with firms' ability to obtain working capital andso make them less
profitable. This is quite distinct from any adverse effects thatcontractionary
monetary policies and high interest rates may have on the demand for investment
goods. The idea that contractionary monetary policies have adverseproductivity
effects can explain why real wages often fall rather than riseduring
recessions, and why firms postpone production by liquidating inventories rather
20
We know of only one other case involving major transfers between
publicly traded companies. On March 10, 1986, LAG Minerals, Ltd., a Canadian
gold mining company, was ordered to turn over a gold mine valued at $1-$2
billion to International Corona and Teck Corporation, two otherCanadian gold
mining companies. On the day after the court decision, relative to the Toronto
Stock Exchange 300 Index, LAG fell by $501 million in marketvalue, and
International Corona and Teck rose by $224 million in market value. The loss
ratio was thus 33 percent. We hope to investigate thiscase more fully in the
future.18
than building up stocks during recessions. The Texaco-Pennzoil evidence
supports the contention that financial distress can interfere with firms'
ability to produce efficiently.
Finally, our results support to at least some extent arguments that the
secondary costs of the Latin American debt burden are inhibiting the growth of
these countries. The Texaco-Pennzoil case demonstrates that debt burdens can be
greatly magnified by the disruptions they create. If this is true with
developing country debt, it is possible that appropriately designed debt relief
policies could help both the banks and the debtor nations.References
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Value Relative to




Date Texaco Pennzoil Ratio
1 Nov. 19, 1985 -$806.1 $425.5 47.2%
(275.9) (82.4)
2 Dec. 10, 1985 -$364.4 $156.5 57.1%
(227.5) (114.7)
3 Dec. 18, 1985 $88.5 -$307.3
(202.5) (118.7)
4 Jan. 10, 1986 -$53.7 -$197.8
(217.7) (132.4)
5 Feb. 20, 1986 -$60.6 -$43.8
(213.5) (100.2)
6 Feb. 12, 1987 -$1,267.4 $270.2 78.9%
(315.9) (132.0)
7 Apr. 6, 1987 -$1,061.9 $299.3 71.8%
(304.9) (147.5)
TOTAL -$3,525.6 $602.6 81.3%
(674.3) (317.5)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Millionsof dollars
**Percentageof change in Texaco's value not accounted for by
change in Pennzoil's value